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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~l.l\R\"IX J>E'fERSEN and 
B~~\~ERL \ .. PE'fERSEN, his 'vife, 
Plaintiffs and Respo1Lde~nts, 
vs. 
\"().~{L MEl'HAM, 




S'rA'fEJIEN,.f OF NATURE OF CASE 
1"his is an action by the Respondents, )!arvin 
Jl etersen and Bever l v Petersen. for rescission of a con-
. ' 
tract and demanding a reconveyance of realty situated 
in the State of ''ryoming, which was conveyed by them 
to ..~.\ppellant in exchange for an interest in seller's 
contract of sale of property in Idaho, based upon 
l'ertain misrepresentations alleged to have been made 
by the ..~.\ppellant in order to induce the Respondents to 
enter into the exchange. 
3 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER C,QUR'f 
The case was tried to the Court sitting without a 
jury, and Respondents were awarded judgment, can-
celling and rescinding a contract entered into by the 
Appellant and Respondents and ordering a reconyey-
ance of the land in question to the Respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondents seek judgment of this Court 
affirming the judgment and decree of the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF }_,ACTS 
The Respondents agree in part with the Appel-
lant's Statement of Facts, but in addition thereto desire 
to call to the court's attention additional facts totally 
ignored in the Appellant's Brief, and upon which the 
Court below rested its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and the ultimate Judgment and Decree. 
Prior to October 1, 1962, Respondents listed their 
Wyoming ranch property for sale with Duffin Realty 
through its licensed real estate agent, Glen Van Tassell. 
At approximately the same time, the Appellant entered 
into a listing agreement listing his purchaser's interest 
in a motel property situated in Arco, Idaho, with the 
same real estate company. Thereafter, the agent, Glen 
Van Tassell, and the real estate broker, Gordon Duffin, 
in company with the Appellant himself, made personal 
4 
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contacts \vith at least six prospective purchasers of the 
interest of the i\ ppellaut in and to the .r\.rco ~lotel. In 
the tirst part of ()etober. 196~, ( R 31) the Appellant, 
\"an 'l.'assell and Duffin took one \ \rinn Nelson, a far1ner 
of !Jayton. Idaho. to the Inotel for the purpose of selling 
the ~\ ppcllunt's interest therei11 to Mr. Nelson. During 
the l'ourse of their conversations, the Appellant told 
all of those present. including \\'inn Nelson, that the 
ntotel had n1ade hin1 $3,000.00 per month and that he 
had books to prove it. (R 31) (R 124). 
On a subsequent occasion, approximately the middle 
of ()l'tober of the same year, (R 33) the Appellant met 
Zola Beebe, Dek Nickolson, \ran Tassell and Duffin 
at the 1notel and in the course of their conversations 
the .i\ppellant told all who were present that the motel 
hnd mnde him $3,000.00 per month. (R 34). Nickolson 
was not satitied with the Appellant's records of income 
and asked that tnore detailed information be procured. 
'I' he .. \ ppellant later on furnished a written operating 
~ tate1nent to the office of Duffin Realty pursuant to 
the request of l\lr. Nickolson. These records showed 
a net inco1ne of approximately $3,000.00 per month. 
1 R a;). \""an Tassell examined this record and later 
displayed it to )Irs. Zola Beebe ( R 138) and Respond-
ent. ~!arvin Petersen. (R 40). 
\,.an Tassell and the Appellant later went to the 
hotne of Dell X ebeker. another rancher in Star ,.,. alley, 
''""roming. and offered the Appellant's interest in the 
"\reo ~Iotel to him for sale. On that occasion the Appel-
5 
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lant told this prospective buyer that this motel netted 
him $3,000.00 per month. (R 127 & 128). 
Another rancher, Mr. Alma Shumway, also of Star 
Valley, Wyoming, had his farm for sale and he was coll-
tacted by both Van Tassell and the Appellant and he 
was told by either Van Tassell or Appellant in the 
presence of both of them that the motel had showed a 
$3,000.00 a month net profit for the Appellant. ( R IB2). 
Sometime in November of 1962, (R 136) )Irs. 
Zola Beebe saw the motel for the first time. She 1net 
the Appellant at the motel and the Appellant told her 
and 'ran Tassell that he had averaged $3,000.00 per 
month from his operation of the motel. (R 137). Later 
on, in the office of Duffin Realty, Mrs. Beebe was 
shown written records showing with some fluctuations 
an approximtae net income of $3,000.00 per month. (R 
138) . After seeing these records, Mrs. Beebe entered 
into a contract to purchase and took over the motel on 
the 2nd day of January, 1963. (R 138). She remained 
there until the 13th of March of the same year. Later 
on, Van Tassell brought Exhibit P4 to Mrs. Beebe, 
(R 139) which was another operating statement sub-
sequently submitted by the Appellant to the office of 
Duffin Realty, and which had been typed by the Duffin 
Realty secretary, Kay Lee. 
Mrs. Beebe had also discovered some records in 
the furnace room of the motel, Exhibit P5, and after 
examining both P4 and P5, Mrs. Beebe told Mr. 'ran 
Tassell that she wanted to come home (R 139). Both 
6 
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of these records show Appellant did not net $3,000.00 
per 1nonth or anything close to it. She made no payment 
under the ter1ns of the original contract with Appellant 
whutsoe,·er (R 140), and after returning to Salt Lake 
City catne to the office of Respondents' Counsel in 
ccnnpnny with the Respondents and thereafter this law 
suit was filed ( R 140). 
\"an 'fassell's dealings with the Respondents came 
in the tnidlst of these various negotiations. He first 
contacted the1u concerning Appellant's interest in the 
rnotel during the first part of December, 1962. (R 63). 
ILe told them of the motel and what Appellant told 
hin1 he made per month from its operation. ( R 63) . He 
also showed Respondent, Marvin Petersen, the original 
operating statetnent furnished to the office of Duffin 
ltealty by Appellant showing approximately $3,000.00 
per 1nonth net income. ( R 64) . The Plaintiff went 
oYer these records with Van Tassell and subsequently 
\rent home and discussed the records with his wife. ( R 
fl4). Respondents relied upon what Van Tassell had 
told them concerning the income of the motel and upon 
this operating statement. (R 64). On or about Decem-
ber 20, 1962, the Respondents entered into an Agree-
Inent "·ith Appellant wherein Respondents purchased 
59.asro of Appellant's agreements of sale with ~Irs. 
Zola Beebe, and in return delivered a Deed of Con-
Yeyance of the Respondents' interest in their ranch 
111 Star '"'alley. 'Vyoming. (R 65). 
4-\fter 'ran Tassell had been shown the second 
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operating statement typed by Mrs. Kay Lee in the 
early part of January, 1963, he had some argun1ents 
with his broker, Gordon Duffin, concerning these rec-
ords, (R 42) and he went to the Appellant and told 
him these were not in accordance with the original 
I'ecords Appellant had furnished to him. ( R -:1.2) • ''rhcn 
'ran Tassell was asked for the substance of his con-
versation with Appellant, he testified as follows: 
"Well, I told Mr. Mecham, I said, '\r oyl, this 
is not the same set of records that we represented 
this place to Mr. Petersen and Mrs. Beebe.' And 
I said, 'Something has got to be done about it. 
Mrs. Beebe is unhappy. This place isn't doing 
the business she was told it would do. Mr. J>eter-
sen relied on my figures when I sold him the 
equity in this motel, and it was entirely misrep-
resented.' '' 
Getting no satisfaction from either of these people, 
he went first to Mrs. Beebe (R 43) and disclosed the 
discrepancies and fraud which had been committed and 
subsequently went to the Respondents and told the 
whole story to them. (R 44). They contacted their 
lawyers and this action was commenced. ( R 45). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IX 
F,INDING "THAT TO INDUCE THE PLAIX-
TIFFS TO ENTER INTO SAID WRITTEX 
AGREEMEN'l., THE DEFENDANT REPRE-
SENTED ('fO PLAINTIFFS) 'fRAT DURING 
8 
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'I'IIE PEltl(JD <>I·' '1,1~1~~ HE HAD OPERA'l,-
LlJ 'rilE ~IO'f.EL liE IIAD )lADE .t\X r\. \TElt-
"\t;E ~E'f l~l,OJIJ~: Ot' ~a,ooo.ooPER JlON'l'H; 
·r 11~\'r 'r II IS ltE I>ItESEN'l,r\'l"ION \\r AS ,. \ 
~1"\'l'E I{ I r\1~ lt~~I>l{ I~: sENT AT ION.'' 
l,Ul~'f ll. 'l'HE 'fRIAL COUR'l, I~,UR'fHElt 
Eltltl~:u IX I~'INDlNG 'fHA,f THE PLAIN-
'rii·'I~,s \\'~~RE READY, WILLING AND r\.BLE 
'l'(l l, . \ X C EL r\ND 'fERMIN A 'I'E T H E 
.\CiltJ1:J~~l ~~~'f ll\'" AND BETWEEN ,fHE 
11 .\RTIES. 
l)OIN'f III: THE UNCONTRO\TERTED 
'l'ES'l'lj\lON\T BY 'l"HE PLAINTIFFS Sl-IO'''"S 
'l'll..\ T 1.,HE\T EN,fERED INTO 'l,HE COX-
'l'lt.t\l,1, \\'l'fH THE DEFENDANT BEl,.c\.USE~ 
(lF 1,11~~ l{El)RESENTATIONS BY 'rAN TAS-
SELL ''r I'rH RESPECT TO MRS. BEEBE 
.\Xll XO'l' BEC.AL;SE OF 'fHE REPRESEK-
'1\-\.'l'IOXS .c\S TO INCOME. 
ARGUMENT 
POIXT I: 'l,HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IX 
t,IXDIXG ''THAT TO INDUCE THE PLAIX-
'fi~,FS 'fO E~TER INTO SAID WRI'fTEX 
4-\GREE~IEXT THE DEFENDANT RE~PRE­
SEXTED (TO PLAINTIFFS) THAT Dl~RIX(-; 
rrHE PERIOD OF TIME HE HAD OPE RAT-
9 
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ED 1"'HE MO'fEL HE HAD 1\IADE AN 1\. \TEH-
AGE NE1" INCOME OF $3,000.00PER MON'fH; 
THAT THIS REPRESENTA'I'ION '\r.t\S ~\ 
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION." 
The Appellant first argues that the Court erred 
in Finding of Fact No. 3 in two particulars: 
l. In finding that Defendant made any represcu-
ta tion at all to the Plaintiffs, and 
2. In finding that the alleged misrepresentation 
was material. 
The Respondents will argue these points in the 
order set forth by the Appellant. 
I. THE COURT DID NO'f ERR IN ~"'IND­
ING THA'f APPELLANT MADE REPRE-
SENTATIONS TO THE RESPONDEN'rS. 
'fhe whole argument of the Appellant seems to be based 
upon the fact that the Appellant had no personal deal-
ings with the Respondents prior to the time that the 
Respondents entered into the transaction with the Ap-
pellant. It is true that Mr. Petersen at no time claimed 
to have had a personal conversation with Mr. Mecham 
prior to entering into the contract. This, however, cer-
tainly does not defeat his right of action. The familiar 
rule of law applicable to the case at bar has been well set 
forth in the case of Crystal Pier Amusement Co. vs. 
Cannan, (Cal.) 25 Pac.2d 839, 91 ALR 1357. That case 
hodls that false representations, to be actionable, need 
10 
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not have hccu directly uutde to the person suing therefor, 
hut it is sutt'icicnt if they 'vere made to a third persoll, 
with the intention that they should reach the ears of 
thl' Plaintitl' and he acted upon by him. 
'fhe court further states: 
H ..t\. representation made to one person with the 
intention thut it shall reach the ears of another, 
and be ucted upon by him, and which does reach 
hin1, and is acted upon by hin1 to his injury, giYes 
the person so acting upon it the same right to 
relief or redress as if it had been 1nade to hin1 
directly.'' Henry v. Dennis, (Maine) 49 Atlantic 
58. 
In the lleury case, we find this language: 
''It is of no consequence that the letter was 
directed to \V. S. Henry and Co1npany, when 
it \\'as in fact relied upon by Henry as a member 
of the fir1n of Henry & Parsons. It is not neces-
sary~ in order for a Defendant to be liable for 
the consequences of his misrepresentations, that 
he should know the names of the persons to whom 
the 1nisrepresentations may be communicated, 
proYiued, he contemplated that they should be 
comn1unicated to others and be acted upon by 
then1. '' 
In the case at bar, the Appellant, in the presence 
of the real estate broker~ Duffin, and his authorized 
ngent. '~an 'fassell, told a number of prospectiYe pur-
l'hasers "·hat his income from the motel operation had 
been. He told this in the forepart of October to 'Vinn 
X elson of Dayton, Idaho. Thereafter he told the same 
thing to :\Irs. Zola Beebe and Dek Nickolson. Later he 
11 
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told the same thing to Dell Nebeker and Alma Shunl-
way. All of these statements were made on occasiou~ 
in which he was endeavoring to sell his motel interest 
and to persons he hoped would be interested in pur-
chasing it. Certainly, it does not take argument to per-
suade anyone that one of the vital considerations any 
prospective purchaser would have in the motel property 
or any interest therein would be what the past perforin-
ance of the motel had been under the operation of the 
proposed seller. In the case at bar, each of the prospec-
tive purchasers who testified were advised either by 
the Appellant himself, or by Van 'fassell in the pres-
ence of the Appellant that this motel had produced a 
net income to the Appellant of $3,000.00 per month. 
The Appellant having so represented his earnings fro1n 
the motel in the presence of the rea1 estate broker and 
authorized agent of the company with whom he listed 
the property for sale, can hardly express surprise that 
Van Tassell, in attempting to sell the Appellant's in-
terest in the property to the Respondents, told them 
that the motel had netted the Appellant $3,000.00 a 
month during the period of time he operated it, and 
showed the Respondent, Marvin Petersen, the books 
and records to that effect, which had been delivered to 
Duffin Realty by the Appellant. The facts in this 
case fall clearly within the rules set forth in Crystal 
Pier Amusement Co. vs. Cannan, and which rule has 
also been set forth in 23 Am. Jur., page 955, as follows: 
"In order to be relied upon, a representation 
may be, and frequently is, made directly to the 
12 
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injured person hy the perso11 sought to be 
<.'hargcd. lJireet state1nent to a representee. how-
ever, is not ah,·ays necessary in order to give 
sut·h rep1·esentce a right to rely upon a statement 
nuule. for it is inunaterial whether it is made to 
hin1 directly or .. indirectly, or whether it passes 
through a direet or circuitous channel in reaching 
hitn. provided it is made with the intent that it 
shall reach hitn and be acted upon by him, and 
that such intent is in fact accotnplished. For 
exa1nple, a representation may be relied upon 
if it is n1ade to a third person to be communicated 
to the complaining person, or with a view of 
reaching and influencing him, or to a third person 
in his presence with a view to influence him, or 
if it is tnade to a class of persons of whom the 
con1plaining party is one, or even if it is made 
to the public generally with a view to its being 
acted upon and the complaining party, as one 
of the public, acts on it and suffers damage 
thereby. It is not necessary that the person mak-
ing a representation knows the names of the 
persons to 'vhom it may be communicated, pro-
,~ided he contemplates that it shall be cotnmuni-
cated to others and be acted upon by them.'' 
:E,·en if it \vere argued that the Appellant did not 
kno"· the llespondents personally at the time repre-
sentation "·as Inade to them, certainly he knew he had 
this interest in the motel property listed for sale and 
that inquiries concerning the past operation of the 
n1otel "~bile it "·as under his management and owner-
ship \\·ould be communicated by the broker and his 
agents in the same manner the Appellant had repre-
sented the operation of the motel to the broker and his 
13 
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agent. Presumably, he would be anxious to have this 
infor1nation given to all prospective purchasers inas-
much as he had freely given the san1e infor1nation hiin· 
self, in the presence of the broker and the agent, to 
several other prospective purchasers. 'fhere is no evi-
dence that he ever, at any time, attempted to withdraw 
this information until January, when he furnished the 
second set of records to Duffin Realty. It was this see-
ond set of books which were so far different fron1 the 
representations made to the Respondents, l\frs. lJeebc 
and the other prospective purchasers, that caused ~Irs. 
Beebe to leave the motel, refusing to make any payn1ent 
on the contract. Then, upon the obtaining the true facts, 
the Respondents commenced this action for recission. 
'I~ he Appellant in the first full paragraph of his 
Brief, at page 8 thereof, makes a most interesting 
observation. The statement beginning with the second 
sentence states as follows: 
"This appears from the fact that Van Tassell 
was the listing agent for both the parties, and 
thus, his representations are not chargeable to 
the Defendant any more than they are charge-
able to the Plaintiffs." 
The statement is true that Van Tassell was the 
agent for both parties. It would, therefore, follow that 
'ran '"l~assell was the agent for the Appellant in repre-
senting to the Respondents and all prospective pur-
chasers the operation of the motel, and Van Tassell 
would be the agent of the Respondents for the purpose 
of representing their ranch in Star Valley, Wyoming, 
14 
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to all prospective purchasers. 'l,hus, the representation 
of ,. an 'l'assl'll us ag·ent for the Appellant in represent-
ing thl' 1nonthly incotne frotn the motel to the Respond-
ents \\'otdd be chargeable to the Appellant. The Trial 
Court felt it \vas not necessary under the facts of this 
l'ast' to tind that ,. ~lll 'fassell was the Appellant's agent 
in connection 'vith the representations made because of 
the prior rule heretofore set forth. However, the agency 
rule to 'vhich the Appellant has alluded in his Brief 
would charge the .~\ ppellant with the false representa-
tions rna de hy \,.an 'fassell. 
2. 'fHE COLTRT DID NOT ERR IN FIND-
I~(; 'fl-lr\.'r 'fHE ALLEGED )llSREPRE-
SEXTi\1"ION ''rAS l\IATERIAL. The next argu-
tnent of the Appellant is founded upon Appellant's 
eontention that the interest acquired by the Respond-
l'nts "·as not in the motel or its income, but merely a 
t'rnction of the Appellant's sellers' interest in the con-
tract bet,veen the Appellant and ~Irs. Zola Beebe. The 
4\ppellant argues that the interest acquired by the 
l{espondents "·as not an interest in the motel itself, 
and, therefore, they had no right to rely upon the rep-
resentations as to income. It is argued that these rep-
resentations \vould only be 1naterial between l\Irs. Beebe 
and the .L-\ ppellant and could not be a material con-
sideration for the inducement of the transaction between 
4-\ppellant and Respondents . 
.L-\s principal authority for the proposition that the 
reported income from the Appellant's operation of the 
15 
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motel is immaterial and collateral to the trausactio11 
between the Appellant and Respondents, Appellaut 
cites 23 Am. Jur.~ Section 113, on Fraud and Deceit. 
Here Appellant cites the first part of paragraph 11:3. 
but does not quote the last part of the paragraph. 'fhe 
last part is most significant and provides as follo"·s: 
''It has been held, however, that they need not 
relate directly to the nature and character of the 
subject matter of the contract, but that it is suf-
ficient if they are so closely connected with the 
contract that the parties would not, except for 
the representations, have entered into it, and by 
such reprseentations were induced to enter into 
it to the knowl~,dge of the other party." 
Furthermore the test of materiality of the repre-
sentation has been well stated in 37 CJS~ page 252, in 
the following language: 
"A false representation to be actionable, or, 
likewise, a false concealment to be actionable, 
must relate to a Ina tter rna terial to the transac-
tion involved; that is, the false representation or 
concealment 1nust be the efficient, inducing and 
proximate cause, or the determining ground, of 
action or omission. Thus, representations are 
material if the transaction would not have oc-
curred in their absence or with knowledge of 
their falsity, and if they are related directly to 
the transaction involved. Likewise, the conceal-
ment of facts which, if known, would have in-
fluenced a party to refrain from action causing 
injury has been held material. A representation 
is i1nmaterial if the same thing would have been 
done in the same way in the absence of such 
representation; and, in general, failure to dis-
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close facts \\'hich did not substantially affect the 
trattsaetiotl have been held immaterial. Repre-
sentations nrc likewise immaterial if they caused 
no injury. or if they were mere expressions of 
opinion on '"hieh the hearer had no right to rely.,, 
'ro test the ~ase at bar by these principals, we ask 
the question as to \vhether the Respondents would haYc 
entered into their transaction 'vith the r\.ppellants ex-
cept for the statetnents reported to them concerning 
the net incotne of the motel. 
In the first place, they had never seen the motel 
itself. 'fhis \\·as because the Respondent, Marvin Peter-
sen. had back trouble, and could not ride in an auto-
tnobile. (It 72). However, the Respondent, Marvin 
l )etersen, exatnined the books and records furnished 
to Duffin llealty by the Appellant. He testified that 
he discussed these same records with his wife, and that 
they relied upon this information before being willing 
to enter into the transaction. The report that the motel 
had been sho"·ing this profit to the Appellant was a 
prin1e consideration to them. In the event the pur-
('hnser failed in the payment of the contract, the past 
record of incon1e "·as a material consideration as to 
"·hat kind of property the Respondents could expect 
to take back and 'vha t kinds of expectations they "·ould 
have in contetnplating a resale of the property. 
Certainly. the n1a tter of the record of income of the 
prior o'vner of the motel is not a collateral and imma-
terial item to the Respondent. If it had been represented 
to haYe had a poor prior existence, one might expect 
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a new purchaser would have a similar experience and 
hence, this would be a questionable investment. \\rhere 
it is represented that the motel operation was sho,riug 
a good profit, one might expect a new purchaser of th(' 
property to have a similar profitable experience fron1 
which one might expect a good record of contract pay-
ments. Therefore, under the tests set forth by the 
authorities cited above, there can be no question but 
what the representations of prior income were very 
material considerations. As a matter of fact, as testified 
by Van Tassell, the real estate agent, these representa-
tions were the very basis upon which he sold the frac-
tional interest of the Appellant's contract equity in the 
motel to the Respondents. 
POIN'f II. THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER 
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFFS WERE READY, WILLING AND ABL~: 
TO CANCEL AND TERMINATE THE 
AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
The Appellant argues that there is no record to 
support that portion of Finding of Fact No. 3 which 
states the Plaintiffs at all times have been read~, will-
ing and able to cancel and terminate the written agree-
ment by and between the parties terminating any 
interest they may have acquired therein and returning 
the same to the Defendant. Paragraph 7 of the Coin-
plaint on file herein (R 2) states as follows: 
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"'rhat the J>Iaintiffs are rea<ly. 'villing and 
able to carH.·el and terrninate the written agree-
nlent nutrkcd ~:xhihit ''.t-\" attached hereto and 
return any interest they tnay have by reason 
thereof to the I )efendant." 
'l'his tender and offer \vas made far in advance of 
any foreclosure of the seller's interest by reason of 
non-payn1ent. One sentence in the Pre-trial Order 
ngreed to by both parties is as follows: 
··'rhe parties agree t~t both Plaintiffs and 
llefendant have lost all of their equity in the 
1notel since this action was commenced.'"' (Em-
phasis added). 
lrnder the terms of the Pre-Trial Order, there was 
no issue requiring any proof on this point. After the 
Cornplaint had been filed, if the Appellant had wished 
to have his contract equity restored, he could have had 
it inunedia tely. Rescission is all that the Respondents 
hnYe ever asked for in this case. As set forth in the 
Pre-trial Order, the interest in the contract was lost 
hy reason of non-payment of the payments, but this 
loss occurred after the action was commenced. This 
then becan1e the risk assumed by the Appellant in this 
case. lie knew that after the property had been tendered 
back to hitn. if he refused to accept it, the property may 
thereafter be lost by reason of non-payment and if the 
Respondents prevailed that this loss would be his. He 
ehose to assun1e that risk and, therefore, cannot be 
heard to con1plain at this time. It is further submitted 
that upon the reading of the entire record and exami-
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nation of the evidence adducced at the trial, it is ex-
tremely doubtful that in losing the Appellant's so-
called interest in the motel, anything of value was in 
fact lost. 
POINT III: 'fHE UNCON'l'ROVER'l'ED 
'I'ES'T IMONY BY THE PLAIN'l,IFF'S SHO\V :-; 
'l,HAT THEY ENTERED INTO THE COX-
'fRACT WITH THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE 
0~_, THE REPRESEN'l'ATIONS BY VAN 'r.As-
SELL WITH RESPECT '1"'0 MRS. BEEBE 
AND NOT BECAUSE OF THE REPRES~~X­
TATIONS AS TO INCOME. 
It is true that one of the considerations leading the 
Respondents to enter into the contract with the Appel-
lant were the representations by Van Tassell concern-
ing the character of Mrs. Zola Beebe and her ability 
to operate and manage the motel in a profitable manner. 
The Appellant here argues that this was the only basis 
upon which the Respondents entered into the contract. 
To so argue is to totally ignore the record in this case. 
On cross examination in several places counsel for the 
Appellant tried to get an admission from the Respond-
ent, Marvin Petersen, that he was only relying on Van 
Tassell's representation as to the character and ability 
of Mrs. Beebe. These various encounters between coun-
sel for the Appellant and the witness, Marvin Petersen, 
appear for several pages. (R 74, 75 and 76). Time 
and again the witness told counsel for the Appellant 
that while he was relying upon representations with 
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n·speet to ~Irs. l~eebe, he also relied upon the repre-
sentation that the n1otel had netted the prior o'vner 
~:J,OOO.OO per Inonth in incorne. }4~urthermore, on direct 
exarninution. the record is replete with statements that 
the ltespondents relied upon what they were told by 
ran 'fassell and \vhat they were shown by , ... an 'rassell 
\rus the operation of the r\. ppellant during· the period 
of tirne he had opera ted this rnotel. The evidence is not 
only an1ple on \vhich the court could so find. The evi-
dence repeats over and over again that the outstanding 
n1uterial representation upon which the Respondents 
relied as an inducement to enter into this contract with 
the i\ ppellant \vas the representation that the prior 
O\rner had been making a net profit of $3,000.00 per 
n1onth frorn his operation of the motel. The Respondents 
need not seek out a fragment of the record to this effect 
and then urg-e this court on appeal to sustain the Trial 
Court under familiar rules of law. Rather, the Re-
spondents tnerely invite the Court to examine the record 
because in that examination the Court will find an 
abundance of evidence to the effect that the primary 
inducetnent used by the real estate salesman and the 
prirnary basis upon wihch the Respondents entered 
into this contract was founded upon the representation 
ntade of past incorne from the Appellant's operation of 
the motel. 
Furthern1ore, as the court observed in the last 
sentence of its ~Ien1orandum Decision, "If it were a 
que~tion of , ... an Tassell's testimony alone, the result 
n1ight be different, but hy the testimony of the many 
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others who testified it clearly appears that the Defend-
ant hi1nself induced the contract in question by fraud." 
'fhe various witnesses brought forward by the l{c-
spondents showed a clear pattern in which the Appellant 
himself had represented openly and on various occasions 
that this motel had netted him $3,000.00 per month 
during the months he had operated it and that he had 
books to support it. '!.,here was evidence that these books 
were shown to the Respondents and the record is clear 
that they relied upon these representations as induce-
ment to enter into the contract with the Appellant. It is 
beyond the comprehension of the writer how the Appel-
lant can seriously urge upon this Court that the repre-
sentations of income were not given any real considera-
tion by the Respondents in connection with their enter-
ing into the contract in question. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that each of the 
essential elements in the Trial Court's Finding of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law are fully supported by com-
petent evidence, that the Court committed no error in 
so finding, and that the decision of the Trial Court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON & BETTILYON 
W. W. KIRTON, JR. 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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